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Abstract
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is compli-
cated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being
exogenous to candidates’ entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme
Court decision to strike down Ohio’s ballot access laws as a natural experiment to
overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference esti-
mations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in
Ohio’s petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a significant increase
in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Keywords: Ballot access, petition requirements, electoral competition, natural ex-
periment
JEL Classification: D72, D78
1 Introduction
The idea that competition is a salient prerequisite for the efficient function-
ing of markets is one of the central insights of economics. Consequently,
the literature has thoroughly analyzed the ways in which incumbent firms
might reduce competition, for example, by creating entry barriers to deter
potential competitors.1 Recent contributions in political economics point to a
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nomics, University of Munich, Akademiestr. 1/II, D-80799 Munich. Phone: +49 89 2180-
6753, fax: +49 89 2180-6296, email: johannes.rincke@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
1For a discussion of the literature on barriers to entry see Tirole (1988).
similar importance of competition for political markets (e.g., see Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). But in spite of a number of possible ways in which parties
in power might hinder potential contestants, the empirical evidence regarding
the effectiveness of restrictions to political competition is still very limited.
Our investigation looks at a specific example of entry restrictions on political
markets. In particular, we estimate the effect of ballot access requirements on
the degree of electoral competition in U.S. House elections as measured by the
number of minor party and independent candidates. Since the stringency of
ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates’
entry decisions, we exploit a natural experiment to identify the effectiveness
of ballot access restrictions. Our results suggest that ballot access regulations
as used by most states in the U.S. significantly reduce electoral competition.
Ballot access laws specify the conditions potential candidates need to fulfill
in order to be listed on the ballot. In the U.S., these restrictions greatly dif-
fer between major and minor parties. For major party candidates, the most
common route to get a candidate on the ballot is a primary election. Minor
parties and independent candidates, however, commonly need to file a petition
signed by a certain number of eligible voters. These petition requirements can
potentially be designed by the (major) parties in power in a way that serves
their interests and deters competition from minor political parties and inde-
pendent candidates.2 To put it practically, suppose that in some states major
parties are only challenged by weak competitors, making it unnecessary to
set particularly strict regulations to prevent the entry of those competitors.
In other states, however, potential competitors might be strong and the par-
ties in power will tend to choose more restrictive ballot access requirements
to protect their dominant position. As a consequence, any estimates of the
effectiveness of barriers to entry are prone to bias if the estimation approach
does not account for the endogenous determination of the underlying laws
and regulations. The aim of this contribution is to overcome the endogeneity
problem and to provide reliable evidence on the effectiveness of ballot access
requirements. In doing so, our work builds on recent contributions by Aghion,
2Despite the fact that a majoritarian voting system as in the U.S. promotes the existence
of two dominating political parties (Duverger, 1964), third party as well as independent
candidates frequently appear on the ballot in state as well as federal elections. During the
period considered in our analysis (1952 to 1984), around 17.2% of the races in U.S. House
elections saw three candidates, and an additional 8.7% had four or more candidates.
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Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) which chal-
lenge the traditional view that political institutions like ballot access rules can
be treated as being exogenously given.
To solve the endogeneity problem, our identification strategy exploits variation
in the restrictiveness of ballot access regulations that comes from a natural
experiment. In particular, we make use of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Williams v. Rhodes from 1968 which struck down the highly stringent bal-
lot access laws the state of Ohio had enacted in 1951. The resulting sharp
decrease in Ohio’s signature requirements allows us to identify the impact of
ballot access restrictions on the entry decisions of third party and independent
candidates. Using electoral districts in other states with stable ballot access
regulations as a control group, we show by means of difference-in-difference
estimations that the Supreme Court decision of 1968 resulted in a significant
increase in the number of minor party candidates. The magnitude of our esti-
mates of the effect of Ohio’s ballot access law of 1951 can be interpreted quite
generally. Between 1951 and 1968 the petition requirements for third party
and independent candidates were practically insurmountable in Ohio. Due to
the Supreme Court decision, Ohio had to reduce its signature requirements to
a level that is comparable to the moderate regulations existent in most other
states. Thus, our difference-in-difference estimations quantify the potential
increase in electoral competition if ballot access restrictions were lowered to
moderate levels in the remaining states which practically exclude minor party
candidates until today.3
Our work is related to a number of earlier contributions. Abramson and
Aldrich (1995) and Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996), for example, study
the relevance of third party and independent candidates in the history of U.S.
presidential elections. Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) discuss the determinants
of the number of parties in general and explain it as an outcome of the in-
teraction between the electoral system and the heterogeneity of the society.
One of the first contributions which discusses entry barriers in politics and
how electoral competition can be encouraged by rising the rewards of office
is Tullock (1965). Moreover, there is a small number of empirical studies
3Georgia, for instance, still requires minor party congressional candidates to file peti-
tions, separately for each congressional district, signed by 5 percent of registered voters
eligible to vote in the last election. In order to place its candidates on the ballot in all
Georgia districts, a new party would thus have to collect almost 200,000 signatures.
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analyzing the effectiveness of ballot access laws in deterring minor party can-
didates. Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996) find that higher filling fees increase
the frequency of uncontested seats and decrease the frequency of retirements
significantly when examining congressional election results from 1984 to 1990.
In the same vein, Stratmann (2005) examines the effect of filling fees and signa-
ture requirements on the number of candidates in U.S. Lower House elections
at the state level in 1998 and 2000. His findings also suggest that higher filling
fees reduce both the number of major-party and minor-party candidates. Our
analysis differs from these contributions by explicitly addressing ballot access
regulations as being endogenous to the degree of electoral competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the historical back-
ground of Ohio’s ballot access laws. The empirical approach and the data are
discussed in Section 3. Thereafter, Section 4 presents our results, and Section
5 concludes.
2 The history of ballot access in Ohio
The establishment of election rules was left to the states in the U.S. Consti-
tution of 1788 since its framers did not agree on a unitary election law for
the new federal government.4 Access to the ballot remained entirely unreg-
ulated during much of the 19th century because candidates were allowed to
print and distribute ballot papers themselves. As these practices resulted in
polling irregularities and discouraged independent candidates due to the im-
mense costs of providing their own ballots, the state governments gradually
adopted the Australian Ballot in the 1890s which among others prescribed
that ballots were to be printed and distributed by the state government (Arg-
ersinger, 1980). Consequently, an official nomination procedure for potential
candidates had to be established. These ballot access requirements became in-
creasingly more complex and more stringent in the course of the 20th century.
Since ballot access requirements are set by the state legislators, the demands
vary considerably both in absolute and relative terms.
The state of Ohio introduced a particularly restrictive ballot access law in
4See Bott (1990) for a brief history of ballot access in the United States.
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1951. Interestingly, the circumstances of its introduction seem to substantiate
the notion that the stringency of entry barriers to political markets can, in
general, not be regarded as exogenously given. Before 1951, Ohio required
a third-party candidate to collect the signatures of only one percent of the
registered voters, and third-party candidates frequently appeared on the bal-
lot, both in federal and in state elections. In the 1948 presidential election,
Henry Wallace from the Progressive Party polled 1.3 percent of the votes,
leaving the Republican candidate Harry Truman a margin of only about 7,000
votes to win the state against the Democratic candidate Thomas Dewey. To
rule out the possibility that third candidates prevent a clear victory of one
of the major parties, the Ohio legislature adopted a new ballot access law
in 1951 which practically excluded any third party candidates (Bott, 1990).
To be recognized as a political party, Ohio demanded the submission of a
petition signed by 15 percent of the last gubernatorial vote, an independent
candidate in a state-wide election needed a petition signed by 7 percent of
the last gubernatorial vote, and independent presidential candidates were not
permitted. As a consequence, only the two major parties, which had to satisfy
less strict requirements, were present in Ohio’s political arena in the following
years. Unsatisfied with their exclusion several minor parties challenged the
Ohio ballot access laws by appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court. In October
1968 the Supreme Court ruled in Williams v. Rhodes that Ohio’s regulations
violated the 1st and 14th Amendments of the Constitution. In the Williams
opinion, Justice Black observed that ’[t]he state of Ohio in a series of election
laws has made it virtually impossible for a new political party, even though it
has hundreds of thousands of member, to be placed on the state ballot [...]’.5
Forced to reduce the barriers to entry for non-major party candidates, the
Ohio legislature decided in October 1969 to lower the signature requirements
for new parties to 7 percent and for independent candidates to 4 percent of
the last gubernatorial vote. Yet even this softened regulation was declared
unconstitutional by a three-judge U.S. District Court in July, 1970. Hence,
the Ohio legislature took action again and adopted a new law (effective since
March 1972) which reduced its requirements to 5,000 signatures for an office
voted on statewide (including President) and one percent of the last guberna-
torial vote in the respective district for congressional elections.
5Cited in Bott (1990, p. 176).
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3 Estimation approach and data
The main purpose of our paper is to provide evidence of the effect of ballot ac-
cess restrictions on electoral competition. As mentioned in the introduction,
the identification of this effect is complicated by the apparent endogeneity
of any regulation defining barriers to the entry of new political parties. We
present a straightforward approach to solve the identification problem which
exploits the Supreme Court decision of 1968 and the resulting significant re-
duction of ballot access requirements in Ohio as a natural experiment. To
qualify as a natural experiment the units of observation need to be affected by
a sharp and unexpected change in some key variable of interest (in our case,
the restrictiveness of petition requirements for minor party and independent
candidates). That the change in Ohio’s ballot access laws resulting from the
ruling inWilliams v. Rhodes was sharp is undisputable. The state moved from
being by far the most restrictive state in terms of petition requirements to
a position that was very similar to the rules adopted in most other states.
For a number of reasons the Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Rhodes
can also be regarded as an unexpected event. First of all, when the Supreme
Court struck down the law it had already been in place for 17 years. Secondly,
Williams v. Rhodes was the first ruling against existing ballot access laws in the
history of the Supreme Court. Note furthermore that in Jenness v. Fortson, a
case showing remarkable similarities to Williams v. Rhodes, the Court upheld
the ballot access law of the state of Georgia in 1971.6 Likewise, in a number of
court cases in later years, existing ballot access regulations were confirmed.7
Thus, the behavior of the Supreme Court was not characterized by a gen-
eral tendency to rule against pronouncedly restrictive state ballot access laws.
Rather, Williams v. Rhodes constitutes a unique and unprecedented case in
the history of U.S. ballot access laws.
Our estimation approach aims at comparing electoral competition in congres-
sional districts in Ohio between 1952 and 1984 to electoral competition in a
control group of congressional districts in other states. By means of difference-
in-difference estimations, we identify the impact of the exogenous variation in
the stringency of entry barriers for third party and independent candidates
6Winger (2002) provides a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jen-
ness v. Fortson.
7See e.g. Winger (2002) and Bott (1990).
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induced by the Supreme Court decision of 1968. Our baseline estimation
equation takes the form
#MINORit = α (OHIO × 1970-84)it + β OHIOi + τt + eit, (1)
where #MINORit is the total number of minor party and independent can-
didates that were listed on the ballot in district i in year t. OHIO × 1970-84
is the interaction effect of a Ohio state dummy and a dummy for years af-
ter 1968, i.e. after the Supreme Court decision on Ohio’s ballot access law.8
Moreover, τt is a year effect and eit is a residual. The coefficient α captures
the differential effect of the change in Ohio’s ballot access requirements. Note
that in some estimations we did not include year effects, but just a single post-
shock indicator for years after 1968. We also estimate specifications including
a trend specific to congressional districts in Ohio to account for a possible
trend in electoral competition in this state. This is potentially important as
our estimations might otherwise pick up an independent state-specific trend
in the estimate of α, leading to false conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
petition requirements in preventing electoral competition.9 Note furthermore
that we cannot account for unobserved congressional district effects since the
districts change considerably (at least) every ten years due to redistricting
according to the update of population figures by the decennial census. For
instance, the districts in the 1972 congressional election do not coincide in
general with the districts in the 1968 or 1970 election.
In our analysis, we compare the congressional districts from Ohio with those
from Illinois. The latter constitute a well-suited control group because Illi-
nois was not affected by the treatment, but is very similar to Ohio in many
respects. Illinois districts are eligible for the control group as the Supreme
Court decision did only affect Ohio’s ballot access law. Furthermore, Illinois
did not change its ballot access requirements between 1952 and 1984.10 This is
important, as such changes would interfere with the differential impact of the
Supreme Court decision on Ohio’s congressional districts. Illinois’ election law
8We treat the year 1968 as belonging to the pre-shock period because presumably there
was too little time for most potential new candidates to prepare and run a campaign. We
present robustness checks for this assignment later on, suggesting that assigning the year
1968 to the post-shock period or dropping observations from 1968 does not seem to make
a difference for the main results.
9Details on the specifications are reported in the tables showing the estimation results.
10We checked this by searching over the states’ revised statutes for changes in ballot
access laws for the whole period considered in our analysis.
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Table 1: Means for social and economic characteristics of treatment and control
Variable Year Ohio Illinois
1952 23 25
Number of congressional districts 1968 24 24
1984 21 22
1952 8299 8986
Total population (1,000’s) 1968 10462 10907
1984 10817 11428
1952 5143 5775
Per capita income 1968 7018 7680
1984 8607 9628
1952 0.375 0.361
Educational attainment 1968 0.509 0.501
1984 0.705 0.704
1952 0.708 0.782
Urbanization 1968 0.749 0.827
1984 0.736 0.838
Data sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). Per capita income is measured
in 1980 dollars. Educational attainment refers to share of total population 25 years and over with a high
school diploma or a higher degree. Urbanization is percentage of urban population as defined by the U.S.
Census.
constantly demanded a number of signatures equal to a considerable 5 percent
of the vote in the last election in the respective district in which a candidate
was seeking access to the ballot. Thus, Illinois’s law was similarly restrictive
as Ohio’s one before 1968. As Table 1 shows, Ohio and Illinois are also very
alike in many other respects. First of all, both comprise a similar number of
congressional districts. Ohio has between 21 and 24 districts, while Illinois
has 22 to 25. Moreover, both states are demographically and economically
very much alike. During the period we consider, both have almost the same
population, per capita income, educational attainment and level of urbaniza-
tion. Finally, Illinois is roughly of the same size and geographically close to
Ohio.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the dependent and the key ex-
planatory variables. The data on election outcomes for U.S. House elections
between 1952 and 1984 come from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political
and Social Research (1994). These contain a record for each individual can-
didate, providing information on the candidate’s name, party affiliation, and
the number of votes received. From the party code we identified third party
and independent candidates. In some rare cases the party codes are miss-
ing. Therefore, we checked the party affiliation of all candidates with missing
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Third party and independent candidates 0.123 0.425 0 4
OHIO 0.488 0.500 0 1
1970-84 0.521 0.499 0 1
OHIO× 1970-84 0.256 0.437 0 1
Sample includes all electoral races for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1952 to 1984 in Ohio and
Illinois (Nob=799). Sources: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (1994), the Office
of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, Winger (2006) and the revised state codes for the
respective states and several years. OHIO is an indicator for the state of Ohio. OHIO× 1970-84 is the
interaction between OHIO and an indicator for years after 1968.
party codes by referring to the official congressional election statistics.11 For
our analysis we only considered third party and independent candidates that
were actually listed on the ballot. Hence, we eliminated write-in candidates
from our data set and ignored scattered votes. Moreover, we restrict atten-
tion to general elections. The numbers in Table 2 confirm that our sample is
almost perfectly balanced between districts belonging to either treatment and
control group, and observations from pre- as well as post-shock periods.
4 Results
Before turning to the outcomes of our difference-in-difference estimations, we
will first provide an intuition for our results by a comparison of means of the
number of third party and independent candidates before and after 1968. As
Table 3 shows, the average number of third party and independent candidates
on the ballot in Ohio jumped from virtually zero before 1968 to 0.44 on average
after 1968. In Illinois, however, the increase in the number of third party and
independent candidates was much less pronounced.
This difference is illustrated in more detail in Figure 1. Between 1952 and
1968, in both states the number of third party and independent candidates
was close to zero. While Illinois experienced a moderate increase beginning
in 1972, the average number of third party and independent candidates in
Ohio quickly soared to more than 0.8 in 1976. This number went down to
values around 0.3 in 1978/80 and raised again to a value somewhat below
11These statistics are available from the office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives at http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionInfo/index.html.
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Table 3: Average number of Congressional candidates per district, 1950-1968 and 1970-1984
1952-1968 1970-1984
Nob Mean Std.Dev. Nob Mean Std.Dev.
OHIO
Overall number of candidates 209 1.99 0.18 181 2.36 0.81
Major party candidates 209 1.98 0.14 181 1.92 0.27
Third party & independent candidates 209 0.01 0.12 181 0.44 0.75
ILLINOIS
Overall number of candidates 221 2.00 0.12 188 2.05 0.31
Major party candidates 221 1.99 0.07 188 1.97 0.16
Third party & independent candidates 221 0.01 0.09 188 0.08 0.29
Sample: Congressional districts of Ohio and Illinois in Congressional election years from 1952 to 1984. Total
number of observations=799.
0.8 in 1982. In all years beginning with 1970, the number of third party and
independent candidates in Ohio was higher than in Illinois. The numbers in
Table 3 and the graph in Figure 1 give a first impression of the effectiveness of
Ohio’s ballot access laws before 1968. The evidence suggests that the Supreme
Court decision had a strong and immediate impact on electoral competition.
However, we need a more technical approach to substantiate the descriptive
evidence. In particular, we would like to check the statistical significance of
the effects suggested by the descriptive analysis.
We now turn to the results of our difference-in-difference estimation approach.
Table 4 displays a first set of results. The dependent variable is the number of
third party and independent candidates. Our units of observation are 799 elec-
toral races for the U.S. House of Representatives in Ohio and Illinois between
1952 and 1984.
Column (1) shows the results for a baseline specification of our difference-in-
difference model. Besides the interaction term Ohio×(1970-84), it accounts
only for an Ohio state effect and the indictor for the post-shock period. The
increase in the number of third party and independent candidates in Ohio (rel-
ative to congressional districts in Illinois) resulting from the Supreme Court
decision is estimated to be 0.25 and is significant at the 1% level. The mag-
nitude of the treatment effect is notable (recall that the average number of
minor party candidates is only 0.12 in our sample). Note that we report stan-
dard errors that account for clustering on congressional districts. Since dis-
tricts boundaries change regularly due to redistricting, we form district-specific
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Figure 1: Average number of third party and independent candidates per district in U.S.
House elections, 1950-1984
1950 1960 1970 1980
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clusters for the periods 1952-1960, 1962-1970, 1972-1980, and 1982-1984. This
gives 186 clusters for the sample with 799 observations.
In Column (2) we replace the indicator for post-shock periods by a full series
of year effects. The results of the baseline specification do not change qual-
itatively. In fact, the estimate for the treatment effect increases to 0.31 and
remains highly significant. In Column (3) we split the single treatment effect
employed in the first two specifications into a full series of interaction effects,
giving a separate treatment effect for each post-shock year. Column (3) thus
gives a much more detailed picture of the effects of the change in ballot access
on the entry of third party and independent candidates. We note that the
estimates for all year-specific treatment effects are positive, with five out of
eight estimated coefficients being statistically different from zero at least at
the 5% level. The size of the treatment effect varies between 0.30 in 1978 and
0.65 in 1976.
As mentioned above, the difference-in-difference approach is generally prone
to bias in the estimate of the treatment effect in the presence of a treatment-
group specific trend which is not properly accounted for in the model. To hedge
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Table 4: Ballot access and electoral competition in U.S. House elections, difference-in-
difference estimations based on Ohio and Illinois
Dependent variable: Number of third party and independent candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ohio 0.036 ?? 0.006 0.005 0.029 0.034 0.048 ??? 0.051
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.051) (0.058) (0.015) (0.052)
1970-1984 0.133 ??? - - - - 0.179 ??? -
(0.024) (0.035)
Ohio time trend - - - -0.003 -0.003 - -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Ohio×(1970-84) 0.250 ??? 0.310 ??? - - - 0.180 ??? -
(0.054) (0.061) (0.057)
Ohio×1970 - - 0.119 0.134 ? 0.139 ? - 0.129 ?
(0.070) (0.071) (0.075) (0.069)
Ohio×1972 - - 0.345 ?? 0.364 ?? 0.369 ?? - 0.360 ??
(0.162) (0.163) (0.165) (0.162)
Ohio×1974 - - 0.173 0.195 0.201 - 0.192
(0.194) (0.196) (0.198) (0.195)
Ohio×1976 - - 0.653 ??? 0.678 ??? 0.685 ??? - 0.677 ???
(0.199) (0.201) (0.204) (0.200)
Ohio×1978 - - 0.300 ?? 0.327 ?? 0.335 ?? - -
(0.141) (0.145) (0.150)
Ohio×1980 - - 0.213 0.243 ? 0.252 ? - -
(0.135) (0.141) (0.147)
Ohio×1982 - - 0.620 ??? 0.653 ??? 0.662 ??? - -
(0.207) (0.212) (0.216)
Ohio×1984 - - 0.425 ?? 0.461 ??? 0.471 ??? - -
(0.169) (0.177) (0.183)
Years 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84 1952-84a 1960-76 1960-76
Nob 799 799 799 799 751 427 427
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
a Observations from 1968 omitted. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on districts)
in parentheses. See text for details.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
against such a potential bias, we allow for a time trend specific to districts in
Ohio. As the results reported in Column (4) show, the coefficient of the trend
itself is not statistically different from zero, and the general picture regarding
the treatment effects is unchanged. Note, however, that now seven out of eight
year-specific treatment effects are estimated to be statistically different from
zero at least at the 10% level.
So far we have presented results with observations from the year 1968, i.e. the
year of the Supreme Court decision, assigned to the pre-shock period. In order
to check the robustness of our findings with respect to this assignment, we
excluded these observations and re-estimated the model with the full series
of year-specific treatment effects and including the Ohio time trend. The
results, displayed in Column (5), are almost identical to those obtained with
observations from 1968 assigned to the pre-shock period. We conclude that
the assignment of these observations does not critically affect our results.
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A well-known further criticism of difference-in-difference estimations is that
with many time periods in the sample and significantly serially correlated
observations, the approach may overstate the true effects. To account for
this objection, we re-estimated both the baseline specification (Column (6))
and the model with a full series of year effects, the Ohio time trend and
year-specific treatment effects (Column (7)) using only observations from the
period 1960-1976. This reduces the number of observations to 427. Again,
our results prove to be highly robust. In particular, the coefficient estimates
of the year-specific treatment effects in Column (7) are very close to their
counterparts in Column (6).
The bottom line from the series of difference-in-difference estimations reported
in Table 4 is that the preliminary findings from the descriptive analysis are
confirmed. In particular, we note that the strong effect of the Supreme Court
decision on electoral competition is statistically significant and robust to var-
ious and substantial changes in specification.
A potential objection to our identification approach might be the low vari-
ation in the number of third party and independent candidates in Illinois.
Based on the descriptive evidence reported in Table 3 and Figure 1, one could
argue that our approach comes close to comparing the variation in the num-
ber of candidates in the treatment districts to a variable which is constant
over time in most districts belonging to the control group. In that case the
difference-in-difference approach could be misleading, as the variation in elec-
toral competition in Illinois might simply be suppressed by the very special
circumstances of this particular state, namely its highly restrictive ballot ac-
cess laws. To address this point, we extend our analysis by expanding the
control group by further congressional districts from three additional states:
Indiana, Kentucky and New Jersey. We selected these states based on two
criteria: Firstly, we can only make use of districts from states that did not
change their ballot access laws during at least a substantial part of the time
period under consideration. Secondly, the ballot access laws of the additional
states should be significantly less restrictive than those in Illinois in order to
induce more substantial variation in electoral competition within the control
group.
Table 5 displays descriptive statistics of electoral competition as measured
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Table 5: Average number of congressional candidates per district, 1952-1968 and 1970-1984
1952-1968 1970-1984
Nob Mean Std.Dev. Nob Mean Std.Dev.
IL, IN, KY & NJ
Overall number of candidates 518 2.35 0.83 400 2.53 0.99
Major party candidates 518 1.96 0.17 400 1.98 0.15
Third party & independent candidates 518 0.38 0.80 400 0.55 0.98
Sample includes electoral races for the U.S. House of Representatives from Ohio (1952-1984), Illinois (1952-
1984), Indiana (1952-1980), Kentucky (1952-1976) and New Jersey (1952-1984).
by the number of minor party candidates within the extended control group.
A quick inspection reveals that the number of third party and independent
candidates now exhibits substantial variation both before and after 1968.
Difference-in-difference estimations based on the extended sample should there-
fore provide us with a valid point of reference for the results discussed above.
Note that we cannot employ all observations in the respective sample since
Indiana and Kentucky altered their ballot access rules towards the end of the
period considered. We therefore restrict our attention to the period from 1952
to 1976.
The results based on the extended sample are reported in Table 6. Column
(1) again shows the baseline specification including a full series of state dum-
mies, while Column (2) repeats the estimation with a full series of year effects
instead of a single indicator for post-shock-periods. We obtain highly signifi-
cant estimates of the treatment effect in both cases, with slightly lower point
estimates compared to the estimations with only districts from Illinois forming
the control group. Following the example of the results presented in Table 4,
Column (3) replaces the single treatment effect by year specific interactions.
Again, we find all estimated parameters to be positive, and three out of five
effects are significant at least at the 5% level. Finally, Column (4) demon-
strates that adding a time trend specific to districts in Ohio does nothing to
our main results.
We conclude that adding congressional districts from three additional states
to extend the control group and to induce higher variation in electoral com-
petition within this subsample confirms the results derived from estimations
where the control group comprises only districts from Illinois.
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Table 6: Ballot access and electoral competition in U.S. House elections, difference-in-
difference estimations based on districts in Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky and New Jersey
Dependent variable: Number of third party and independent candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ohio -1.19 ??? -1.20 ??? -1.21 ??? -1.26 ???
(0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.166)
Illinois -1.21 ??? -1.21 ??? -1.22 ??? -1.21 ???
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Indiana -0.950 ??? -0.951 ??? -0.951 ??? -0.952 ???
(0.120) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Kentucky -1.05 ??? -1.05 ??? -1.05 ??? -1.05 ???
(0.117) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116)
1970-1984 0.122 ? - - -
(0.063)
Ohio time trend - - - 0.006
(0.012)
Ohio×(1970-76) 0.219 ??? 0.228 ??? - -
(0.078) (0.087)
Ohio×1970 - - 0.317 ??? 0.284 ???
(0.099) (0.110)
Ohio×1972 - - 0.486 ??? 0.446 ??
(0.177) (0.188)
Ohio×1974 - - 0.058 0.011
(0.217) (0.229)
Ohio×1976 - - 0.421 ?? 0.368
(0.213) (0.231)
Years 1952-76 1952-76 1952-76 1952-76
Nob 1048 1048 1048 1048
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on districts) in parentheses. See text for details.
? 10% significance level.
?? Idem., 5%.
??? Idem., 1%.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of barriers to entry on electoral competition.
In particular, we provide evidence on the impact of ballot access restrictions
on entry decisions of third party and independent candidates. We note that
earlier studies have failed to take account of the potential endogeneity of ballot
access requirements. Taking seriously recent contributions by Aghion, Alesina,
and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) claiming that po-
litical institutions should generally be treated as endogenous, we suggest an
identification approach that exploits exogenous variation in the stringency of
ballot access requirements. The identification rests on the idea to utilize the
U.S. Supreme Court decision of 1968 to struck down Ohio’s ballot access law
and the resulting sharp decrease in signature requirements for third party
and independent candidates in Ohio as a natural experiment. By means of
difference-in-difference estimations using observations from electoral races in
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U.S. House elections from 1952 to 1984, we identify the effectiveness of ballot
access restrictions in deterring electoral competition.
Our results indicate that ballot access requirements as used in most U.S. states
can be highly effective in reducing the degree of electoral competition faced
by major party candidates. This finding, in turn, suggests to take serious the
potential endogeneity of political institutions, in particular in cases where it
is plausible to assume that stakes of powerful players in the political arena
are directly affected by the design of certain institutions. Hence, the empiri-
cal evidence presented in this study strongly suggests to understand political
institutions as being subject to strategic choice of influential actors such as
governments and legislatures.
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